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The EU and Japan are now concluding two partnership agreements that should facilitate bilateral trade, streamline
political and security cooperation and reinforce shared values. While they buttress the strategic scope of their
cooperation as "like-minded" partners, their ratification may take a while. Furthermore, in order to measure up to
contemporary global and regional challenges, the political and economic agreements need to be followed 
up by concrete initiatives in such realms as infrastructure investment (connectivity), maritime security and nuclear
non-proliferation.
BACKGROUND – WORDS THAT SPOKE LOUDER THAN ACTION
Since 2013, the European Union (EU) and Japan have been simultaneously negotiating two agreements: an
Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) and a Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA). Both should be ready for
signing and ratification in 2018. While this marks a milestone in the relationship between Brussels and Tokyo, it
also bolsters the global significance of the EU-Japan partnership in an unfolding 'Asian century'. What remains to
be seen is whether concrete cooperation will measure up to the challenges the partnerships purport to address.
The EU and Japan have had a longstanding relationship that originated in 1959 when Tokyo accredited its
ambassador to the European Communities in Brussels. In 1991, Brussels and Tokyo issued a Joint Declaration to
"intensify their dialogue and to strengthen their co-operation and partnership" and they started holding annual
summits. Ten years later, a Japan-EU Action Plan was signed to put "greater focus on concrete measures and
concerted action." Neither the Joint Declaration nor the Action Plan have proved sufficient, however, to catalyse
major joint initiatives.
In May 2011, Tokyo and Brussels agreed to start exploring the possibility of a Free Trade Agreement (FTA). Actual
negotiations began in 2013, with the aim to address those obstacles barring EU-Japan trade from realising its full
potential. With Japan and the EU representing 30% of global GDP, the EPA would make it the world's largest
trading bloc. For the EU, economic gains would be of a magnitude comparable to those accruing from an FTA
with the United States.1 For Japan, an FTA would reportedly contribute to raising its GDP by 0,7%.2
Boosting trade is not the sole issue at stake, however, and the EU insists on negotiating in parallel a legally-binding
agreement covering political and security issues. For Brussels, the aim of the two-track negotiation is to give
strategic depth to the EU-Japan partnership and make it more operational. This shift is reflected in the change of
wording from "like-minded global partners and major economies"3 to "like-minded strategic partners and major
economies sharing common values and principles."4 The agreements thus link the geo-economics with the
geopolitics of the partnership. For both, this means "focusing resources and energy on negotiating major deals"
with these pivotal countries to shape the global order.5
Common challenges
The EU and Japan each face the common challenge of slow economic growth, ageing societies and "post-industrial
productive re-conversion".6 In December 2012, the return to power of Shinzo Abe ushered in a new era of political
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stability and wide-ranging economic reforms for Japan. The prime minister's electoral selling point was a 'Growth
strategy', coined 'Abenomics'.
In the foreign policy field, both partners have also risen to security challenges. The Abe government has been
dealing with fast-changing regional conditions, marked by territorial disputes with Japan's neighbours (China,
Russia, and South Korea), the rise of China, growing uncertainty over Trump's Asia policy and an expanding North
Korean nuclear threat. Japan has thus embarked on a set of unprecedented security reforms. Regarding the role of
its Self-Defence Forces, it has introduced a limited right of 'collective self-defence', whereby Japanese forces
could be allowed to use force not only if Japan itself is under attack but also in the event of a close ally being
struck. It has also expanded the scope of the US-Japan alliance and authorised the export of Japanese-made
defence products.
Meanwhile, the EU has experienced profound changes of its own from the consequences of a traumatic
economic crisis to the geopolitical developments in Ukraine, Syria, Iraq or Libya. It has also been addressing
rapidly evolving domestic security and terrorist threats. More fundamentally, the Ukrainian crisis has challenged
the EU's 'idealist strategic paradigm', namely the comfortable post-modern perception that "geopolitics and
power politics no longer existed".7 As a result, in 2016, the EU launched a revamped 'Global Strategy', confirming
that it was now pursuing its foreign policy interests more pragmatically: "our fundamental values", it stated, "are
embedded in our interests."
STATE OF PLAY – CHANGING GEAR
To finalise both agreements, European and Japanese negotiators have had to overcome divergences that provide
insights both into bilateral relations and multilateral cooperation as a whole.
The ratification process
The EPA and SPA were agreed upon in principle at the 24th EU-Japan Summit in July 2017. Additional time was
required, however, to address legal issues. Negotiators have grappled with the "mixed" character of the
partnerships and its implication on the ratification process.8 In the post-Lisbon Union, mixed agreements must be
ratified by member states following their domestic ratification procedures. In 2017, the Parliament of Wallonia
(Belgium) has thus been able to block the ratification of the EU-Canada Free Trade Agreement until it was given
reassurances in the realm of investment protection. In Japan too, resistance to the EPA has surfaced in legislative
debates around the interests of local farmers. Subject to heightened public scrutiny, global strategic ambitions are
increasingly gauged on domestic or political considerations.
Shared values
As democratic societies with common positions on the rule of law, human rights and due process, the EU and
Japan share converging views on the rules and principles that should underpin global order. Negotiators have
long differed, however, on the integration in the SPA of so-called "essential elements" clauses (required by the
EU). The latter allows for a suspension of obligations in case either partner violates human rights.9 At stake, here,
is mainly a divergence on capital punishment: there were 123 death row inmates in Japan by the end of 2017.10
For Brussels, the suspensive clause is part of a foreign policy rationale based on 'principled pragmatism'. With
Canada, the agreement referred to a "particularly serious and substantial violation", the nature and gravity of
which should be "of an exceptional sort".11 With Japan, similar arrangements are expected. Such contentious
issues as whaling have already been put aside. Nevertheless, the EU's exigence has been unnecessarily
uncompromising in the eyes of Tokyo: why impose a suspending clause on Japan, a democratic partner "sharing
common values and principles"?
In support of free and fair trade
Domestically, the EPA takes on particular significance. In Japan, boosting international trade is the third "arrow" of
'Abenomics'. As of 2012, Shinzo Abe had staked much political capital in defending against domestic resistance
a trans-regional free trade agreement with the United States, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). In 2016, President
Trump's withdrawal from TPP negotiations and overall 'America First' policy has put Japan's economic plans in
need of alternatives. The same year, the Brexit referendum raised concerns about trade with Europe, especially as
many Japanese businesses are located in the UK. Trump's election and Brexit have thus prompted Japan to
conclude trade negotiations rapidly. Tokyo now boasts that the 'TPP 2.0' (TPP minus the US) it has recently signed
with ten regional economies as well as the EPA with the EU will together generate an additional US$ 114 billion
(+2,5%) in GDP.12
In the EU, the EPA belongs to the "new generation"13 free trade agreements that Brussels promotes as part of its
economic diplomacy. In Asia, the EU seeks to become a reliable and prominent trading partner. It has recently
signed such FTAs with the Republic of Korea, Vietnam and Singapore while economic partnership and investment
protection discussions are progressing (albeit unevenly) with China, India, Indonesia, Myanmar, the Philippines
and Thailand. Brussels is also pushing for a restart of negotiations over a region-to-region FTA with the Association
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
Cooperation in the field of international security
In security terms, both the EU and Japan see the global rule-based order being eroded by such developments as
nuclear blackmail by North Korea, 'hybrid' warfare in Ukraine, maritime and territorial disputes in the South
China Sea or the risk of a rivalry between the US and China. In this regard, the SPA builds on bilateral cooperation
on a wide array of issues: post-war reconstruction in the Balkans; stability and development in Central Asia, the
Sahel and Sub-Saharan Africa; non-proliferation and nuclear security; disaster management and climate change.
The expected introduction of joint (political and technical) committees overseeing cooperation in and providing
information on the many areas covered by the agreement can contribute to making the partnership more effective.
It is expected to streamline the more than 30 sectoral dialogue mechanisms that the EU and Japan have put in
place over the years. In that regard, concrete instances of cooperation such as Japan's support to the EU's naval
operations or its missions in Niger and Mali may serve as examples.
For Brussels, the agreements should also give substance to an Asia policy that relies on five pillars: promoting
open markets and free and fair trade regimes; building on strategic bilateral relationships to tackle global issues;
contributing to the development of rules-based regional orders; fostering connectivity; and ensuring peace and
stability. The EU is thus expecting to raise its profile as a relevant security partner in Asia. In Japan, the government
should update in 2018 its 2013 National Security Strategy and defence guidelines to integrate a "sense of urgency"
in the design of its defence collaborations.14 Tokyo thus intends to step up its cooperation with Australia, India and
the US (the "Quad") on maritime security. These initiatives translate the Abe government's emphasis on global and
proactive diplomacy in support of its self-styled role as "proactive contributor to peace".
In practical terms, the partnership agreements should thus serve as a leverage for both Brussels and Tokyo in
furthering their respective regional policies and strengthening their common global interests.
PROSPECTS – TRANSLATING COMMITMENTS INTO ACTION
The EU and Japan must follow up on the promise of the partnership agreements by detailing specific initiatives
that they could spearhead.
Regarding trade, the EPA will bring two major manufacturing powerhouses under a 'quality' FTA. When it comes
into force, it will constitute a strong signal that neither the EU nor Japan considers retrenchment from a fair and
open trade regime an option. The potential for such an agreement to constitute a 'building block' towards further
global trade liberalisation, however, will hinge on the tangible benefits that should accrue from the EPA.
Moreover, it will be critical to scale up the level of investment in infrastructure for this trade agreement to bear.
Through its Indo-Pacific initiative, Japan is already promoting the notion of 'connectivity for stability and
prosperity' through 'quality infrastructure'. Similarly, the EU is preparing a strategy on better connecting Europe to
Asia. These agendas must fuel more joint initiatives that could help scale up efforts. For example, Japan and the
EU should coordinate their promotion of international standards and best practices vis-à-vis third parties,
including – but not limited to – China and its Belt and Road initiative. More coordination could also be foreseen
in the context of the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) where connectivity and infrastructure development are a
cornerstone of cooperation.
In geopolitical terms, the SPA will hopefully contribute to bolstering the impact of the cooperation between the
EU and Japan in the G7, the Organization of Economic Co-operation and Development (where the two partners
represent 60% of members' official development assistance), and the United Nations. The EU and Japan are also
strong supporters of the Iran deal. Bilateral cooperation must now expand in critical domains such as space and
cyber15, maritime domain awareness, counter-terrorism and disaster risk management. More specifically, Japan
and the EU should take further action on the ever more critical issues of nuclear non-proliferation and maritime
security, where they both have specific interests, expertise, and competences.
The 'normalisation' of Japan's security and defence profile, as well as the EU's growing involvement in defence
through its Permanent Structured Cooperation and European Defence Fund, might also incentivise cooperation in
defence research and development, perhaps even procurement. Another prospect may be for Tokyo to negotiate a
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Framework Participation Agreement with the EU that would provide the legal grounds for its participation in
operations and missions under the Common Security and Defence Policy.
External challenges and uncertainties can, however, hamper the effectiveness of the EU-Japan 'natural
partnership'. Globally, the erosion of a rule-based order is a challenge that neither the EU nor Japan can manage
separately or jointly. Both parties will continue to need the involvement of such global players as the US or 
China. At a time when China promotes a "New Type of International Relations Featuring Win-Win Cooperation"16
and the US an 'America First' policy of uncertain consequences, Japan and the EU should serve as standard
bearers of stable regional and global regimes that serve the security and economic interests of a large number of
countries. It is paramount to translate commitments into action to preserve the shared interests that underpin the
EU-Japan partnerships.
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